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ABSTRACT 
Econometric Methodology is based on logical positivist principles. Since logical 
positivism has collapsed, it is necessary to re-think these foundations. We show 
that positivist methodology has led econometricians to a meaningless search for 
patterns in the data. An alternative methodology which relates observed patterns 
to real causal structures is proposed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The rise and fall of logical positivism is the most spectacular philosophical story of the twentieth 
century. Rising to prominence in the second quarter of the twentieth century, it swept away all 
contenders, and became widely accepted throughout the academia. Logical positivism provided a 
particular understanding of the nature of knowledge, as well as that of science and of scientific 
methodology. The foundations of the social sciences were re-formulated in the light of this new 
understanding of what science is.  Later on, it became clear that the central tenets of the positivist 
philosophy were wrong.  Logical positivism had a “spectacular crash,” and there was some 
dispute about who had “killed” logical positivism1. As a logical consequence, it became 
necessary to re-examine the foundations of the social science, and to find new bases on which to 
re-construct them. This has occurred to differing degrees in different disciplines. One of the most 
recalcitrant has been economics. As discussed in Zaman (2011), the foundations of economics 
continue to be based on erroneous logical positivist ideas, and hence require radical revisions. 
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1Von Fraasen (1980), a staunch empiricist, writes “Today, however, no one can adhere to any of these philosophical  
positions to any large extent. Logical positivism, … even if one is quite charitable … had a rather spectacular crash.”     
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It is not our intention in this paper to describe the whole story, which would be lengthy as well as 
complex and contentious. We will confine our attention to tracing the harmful impact of a limited 
number of positivist ideas on how econometrics has developed. We will argue that these ideas 
have led to a wrong methodology being accepted and used in econometrics. This wrong 
methodology has prevented progress and advance in knowledge. As evidence for this lack of 
progress, in a talk on the 100th anniversary of the first published regression by Yule, Freedman 
(1997:113) writes: “For nearly a century, investigators in the social sciences have used regression 
models to deduce cause-and-effect relationships from patterns of association. … . In my view, 
this enterprise has not been successful.” 
This paper is structured as follows. Section two below provides a summary of the key positivist 
ideas, and how they lead to a distorted understanding of science. The third section provides 
several case studies showing how positivist methodologies lead us to consider the wrong 
questions. The fourth section shows the contrast and opposition between positivist and realist 
methodologies. The fifth section sketches some possible alternative methods which could be used 
to avoid these mistakes and make progress. The sixth section summarized the conclusions. 
We will also offer a very tentative and preliminary sketch of alternative approaches that could be 
more successful. 
2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 
It is an embarrassingly bold claim that for more than fifty years, econometric methodology has 
been on the wrong track. This is however, just a straightforward consequence of fact that logical 
positivism has provided the foundations for econometric methodology. Even though positivism 
has collapsed, this has not led to the rethinking required to build new foundations. The goal of 
this section is to provide enough details of the history and philosophy of science to make this 
claim plausible. 
2.1. The Rise and Fall of Logical Positivism 
Kung (1997) has documented the battle between the Catholic Church and emerging science in the 
middle ages in Europe. This battle has been enormously important in shaping attitudes
2
 and 
philosophies on both sides. Religion and science have different core functions – one deals with 
ideals for human behavior and social organization, while the other deals with properties of matter 
and energy. Because there is virtually no overlap, peaceful co-existence between the two is 
natural, and this is indeed what occurred in Islamic history. In contrast, in Europe the project was 
launched to “deify” science by the claim that all valid knowledge was the sole province 
ofscience.  
Before the emergence of “philosophy of science,” the question of how to differentiate between 
scientific knowledge and other kinds of human knowledge was studied as the demarcation 
problem. A guiding intuition was the idea that science deals with the material and observable, 
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An application for affiliation by a nearby Jesuit college was rejected at a Cal-Tech faculty meeting in the late 1970’s 
when a physicist reminded them to “Remember Galileo!” 
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while religion, metaphysics, philosophy and the like deal with the unobservable and the abstract. 
Attempts to differentiate between the two domains of knowledge on these grounds failed because 
science also deals with unobservables like gravity and electrons.  
In early twentieth century, Bertrand Russell, a leading atheist philosopher, came up with a 
solution to this dilemma. In an extremely influential paper, Russell (1905) argued that a sentence 
containing the word “unicorns” could be interpreted in a way that avoided taking a stance on the 
issue of whether or not unicorns exist. The “Theory of Descriptions” introduced by Russell 
argued that the word “unicorn” could be parsed as a description of an object. A description like 
“a winged horse” could be meaningful whether or not the object described existed. 
Logical Positivists seized on this idea to conjecture that all references to unobservables like 
gravity and electrons were actually just shorthand for regularities in collections of observations. 
So when we say that there is gravitational attraction between the Earth and the Sun, this is just a 
compact way of saying that the “Earth moves around the Sun in an elliptical orbit” and the 
equations of the orbit can be obtained by positing a gravitational force. To formalize this idea, 
they argued that the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to the set of its observable implications.  
If we accept this idea, then we have a solution to the demarcation problem. Exactly as intuition 
suggests, science deals purely with observables – apparent references to the unobservables can 
reduced to descriptions of patterns in the observables. In contrast, religion deals with 
unobservables in an essential way. It is not possible to parse religious concepts out of existence 
by replacing them with equivalents in the form of observables. This means that scientific 
knowledge is valid, while knowledge imparted by religion is meaningless. This conclusion was 
deeply satisfying to the pro-science faction, which was the vast majority of western intellectuals, 
and became widely accepted. 
Logical positivism was a set of conjectures about the nature of scientific theory, and more 
generally about the nature of human knowledge. Some of the finest minds of the twentieth 
century struggled to prove these conjectures. However these efforts led to the conclusion that 
“nearly all of it was false,” in the words of A. J. Ayer, one of the leading early exponents of this 
philosophy. Suppes (1977) is a comprehensive epitaph which discusses the many difficulties with 
logical positivism in detail. To put the matter in a nutshell, science also involves unobservables in 
an essential way, and these cannot be reduced to descriptions as per Russell’s prescription. 
Unfortunately, the story is far from over. Logical positivism is a complex, sophisticated and 
subtle set of mistaken ideas about the nature of human knowledge. Its complexity is evidenced by 
the failure of some of the most brilliant and sophisticated mathematicians and physicists to see 
that it is all wrong. These wrong ideas were absorbed into the foundational frameworks of social 
sciences. Because they were taught at universities for decades (and indeed, continue to be taught), 
they also seeped into the intellectual framework of the general public. Even though the collapse 
of logical positivism is widely known, few academics know exactly what it was, and why it 
collapsed. Especially among economists, many continue to espouse ideas derived from positivist 
precepts without being aware of any difficulties. The goal of this essay is to show that current 
econometric methodology is fundamentally flawed because it is based on logical positivism. 
Some directions for progress are also sketched. 
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2.2. Kantian background to logical positivism 
In the next section, we will show that positivists misunderstood the nature of science and 
scientific methodology. These misunderstanding continue to be widely believed. We must first 
dig deeper into the foundations of positivist philosophy. These are extensions of certain ideas of 
Kant which were highly influential. Before Kant, the nature of human knowledge could be 
described as follows: 
 
 
Reality impacts upon our limited capabilities of perception via sense data. Our sense data are 
assembled into an image of reality within our mind. Some of the processing required for the 
creation of our mental image is done on a pre-conscious level. The child learns to negotiate the 
real world around him, and to resolve images that he sees into real world objects. Similarly, 
scientific theory is used to deduce the nature of reality from clues furnished by sense data. 
According to the sense data generated by our perceptions, it appears that the sun, moon and stars 
are affixed on a blue sky which lies above the clouds. Some analysis of this sense data leads to 
the idea that the sky is a celestial sphere which rotates around the Earth. Even deeper processing 
leads to the conclusion that the first two images are deceptive, and it is actually the Earth which is 
going around the sun in an orbit. Also, even though sense data show us that the stars look similar 
to each other, and very different from the Sun and the Earth, scientific and logical analysis 
reveals that some of the stars we see are just like the Sun in reality, while others are planets like 
the Earth.  
According to this pre-Kantian understanding, knowledge was obtained by using logic and clues 
furnished by our sense data to acquire an understanding of the nature of reality which generated 
this sense data. Kant proposed to create a “Copernican Revolution” in philosophy by arguing that 
it is our perceptions which create reality, rather than the other way around. To understand this 
paradoxical and apparently nonsensical statement, it is necessary to break it down into more 
elementary pieces. 
1. According to traditional understanding, human knowledge is valid if it provides a correct 
description of reality, and not valid if it fails to describe reality correctly. 
2. Our only access to reality is via our perceptions (sense data). We have no other channels by 
which we can learn about reality.  
3. This means that it is IMPOSSIBLE to match a mental model of reality to reality itself and 
check whether or not it is valid. The true nature of reality (thing-in-itself) is unknowable. This 
means that the traditional idea about what constitutes human knowledge is wrong. We can 
never know whether or not our mental model is an accurate match to reality. 
4. What we think of as reality is actually our mental model of reality. It is now obvious that this 
mental model is a product of our perceptions plus the mental processing we do in going from 
the sense data to the image of reality created in our minds.  
5. The “Copernican Revolution” of Kant consists of replacing the impossible-to-solve 
traditional problem of how to match mental images of reality to reality itself with the 
Reality Perceptions Mental 
Image 
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following Kantian alternative: we should study the mental processes by which sense data are 
converted to images of reality.   
This Copernican Revolution of Kant paved the way for the logical positivist understanding of 
science. Once we believe that electrons and gravity do not exist in reality, but only in the minds 
of the physicists, it becomes plausible to believe that these terms are just convenient shorthand 
for describing regularities in collections of observations. 
2.3. Nominalist versus Realist Views of Science 
Logical positivism led to the following two mistaken ideas about the nature of scientific activity 
which will be the focus of our attention: 
N1: A scientific law is a regularity or a pattern in the collection of observations. This 
has been formalized as the idea of a “covering law” by Nagel. 
N2: The scientific method is to look for patterns and regularities in collections of data. 
There are large numbers of ways to look for patterns. Any pattern we find, if it 
continues to be observed in subsequent observations, is a candidate for a scientific 
law.  
Both of these widely believed ideas about the nature of science are fundamentally wrong. It 
would be convenient to term these as a “nominalist” understanding of science. A realist 
understanding of science is based on the following two alternatives:  
R1: A scientific law reveals causal effects in operation between objects which exist in 
the real world.  
R2: Scientific methodology consists of using clues from sense data to learn about 
objects and causal effects which operate in the real world. 
Note that Kant and the logical positivists would deny the possibility of R1 & R2 since objects and 
causal laws which operate in the real world are “unobservable.” Manicas (1987) has discussed the 
history of how it came it pass that the realist understanding of science was replaced by the 
nominalist one, even though the latter is wrong.    
We now come to a strange and curious twist in the story. The nominalist misunderstanding of the 
nature and methodology of physical science had no effect on the physical sciences. Physicists 
were pleased to learn that they had access to the only valid and reliable sources of knowledge. 
The fact that physicists continued to believe in electrons, gravity, electro-magnetic forces and the 
like was not of concern. No harm was done by confusing models of reality with reality itself.  
The philosophy of science described what scientists did; it did not prescribe how scientists ought 
to act.  
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 In contrast, the social sciences were deeply affected by this positivist misunderstanding of 
physical science. The tremendous prestige of the physical sciences attracted the admiration and 
envy of the humanities. Furthermore, it was widely believed that science was the only valid 
source of knowledge.  The incorrect positivist description of science and scientific methodology 
was taken as a prescription for how to convert studies of human beings into science. This led to 
the following principles being widely adopted as fundamental principles of social science in the 
second quarter of the twentieth century: 
S1. Unobservable entities cannot be invoked as explanatory factors. Social science, like the 
physical sciences, must be built around quantifiable and measurable concepts. 
S2. Morals, values, ideals are unobservable and hence unscientific.  Activism, or efforts to 
create a better society are not part of scientific activity. Social scientists must act as 
neutral, detached observers seeking to describe laws of motion for human and social 
activities.  
The consequences of adopting these principles have been extremely harmful for the development 
of social sciences. It is ironic that these principles are based on a misunderstanding of science 
promoted by logical positivism. Scientists freely utilize unobservables like the strings of string 
theory, black holes, different types of subatomic particles with strange and unusual properties, 
whenever necessary to explain observable phenomena. Social scientists strictly avoid the use of 
unobservables, in an effort to be scientific.  Similarly, aesthetic values like elegance and 
simplicity are often invoked in selection of scientific theories. However social scientists try to 
maintain an appearance of neutrality and “scientific” objectivity in areas where even the choice 
of research topic is dictated by value judgments regarding its relevance and importance to human 
beings.  
Before proceeding to discuss the damage caused by the adoption of these erroneous 
methodological principles in econometrics, we will illustrate the same theme in an assorted 
collection of areas, just to make it more plausible. 
2.4. Errors Due to Misunderstanding of Scientific Methodology 
One of the most unlikely candidates for successful application of positivist theories was the field 
of psychology. How can we study human beings while disregarding the unobservable inner 
psyche of man? Nonetheless, Skinner argued that the goals of psychology should be prediction 
and control of observable behavior patterns of human beings.  We must move beyond “freedom 
and dignity” and model humans as robots which can be programmed by appropriate patterns of 
stimulus and response. Due to the intellectual prestige of logical positivism, behavioral 
psychology became the dominant paradigm for decades in the mid twentieth century.  Paralleling 
the collapse of positivism, numerous problems with key behaviorist ideas have led to substantial 
reconsideration. At the most fundamental level, it seems clear that observed behavior plus 
external environment is not sufficient to explain human action. An influential critique of 
behaviorism along these lines was developed by Chomsky. He showed that the facility with 
which children acquire language shows that they must have internal mental structures designed 
for language. Building on these insights, cognitive psychologists found it necessary to posit 
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unobservable internal mental structures and emotional states to account for human capabilities at 
problem solving.  
Probability Theory is another field which has been substantially damaged by positivist ideas. The 
natural interpretation of the idea that the probability of heads on a fair coin flip is one half is the 
following. There are two possible equally likely states of the world, one with outcome being 
heads and the other with outcome tails. However this statement refers to unobservable events. 
Once one of the outcomes occurs, the other is excluded, and there is no possibility of observing 
an alternative state of the world which did not actually occur. Therefore, even though the 
statement is perfectly meaningful intuitively, it is meaningless according to the positivist criteria.  
The current standard definition of probability based on limiting frequency is perhaps the closest 
observable counterpart to the fundamentally unobservable idea of probability. This is what was 
offered by the founders of this definition, von Mises and Reichenbach, both of whom were 
deeply influenced by positivist ideas. The alternative subjectivist definition also uses observable 
choices over lotteries to define probability in terms of quantifiable beliefs of the observer. 
Founders of this approach shied away from the unobservable alternate reality due to positivist 
predilections. Zaman (2008) argues that both of these approaches are unsatisfactory, and the 
naïve definition of probability based on intuitive ideas works much better, even though it is 
meaningless according to positivist criteria. 
As a third example of errors generated by positivist ideas, consider Samuelson’s theory of 
revealed preference. Economic theory of consumer behavior is based on the idea of utility or 
preference, the internal satisfaction that a consumer feels from purchasing a good. Using this 
unobservable means that economics is not a science according to positivist criteria. Samuelson 
sought to create a new basis for economic theory using the observable choices in place of the 
unobservable preferences. It was eventually proven that all propositions of consumer theory 
could be derived from axioms of revealed preference. The Nobel Prize awarded to Samuelson 
cites his contribution in providing a scientific basis for economics. However, as Wong (2006) has 
pointed out, there is a fundamental flaw in this approach.  The axioms of revealed preference 
make sense ONLY IF there is an underlying unobservable preference. If the consumer has 
achieved the Buddhist ideal of complete indifference to worldly affairs, then his choices would be 
completely arbitrary, not subject to axiomatization.  It is only the existence of internal 
preferences that guarantees consistency and transitivity of choices. Thus the apparent reduction to 
observable choices in revealed preference theory does not succeed in removing the unobservable 
utilities from the theory.   
3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
Hoover (2004) writes that: “Variants on logical positivism came to dominate Anglo-American 
philosophy of science by the 1960s. Although it has been the object of substantial criticism and 
revision, especially since Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), the 
sensibility of logical positivism provides the implicit philosophical background to most empirical 
economics.” Current econometric methodology is based on the positivist understanding of 
science. This methodology is wrong, and needs to be replaced by a realist methodology in order 
to make progress. This is a miniature version of an argument made by Manicas (1987, 2006) at 
International Econometric Review (IER) 
106 
 
greater length and covering a much broader domain. Corresponding to the principles N1 and N2, 
positivist econometrics can be characterized by: 
EN1: Every regression model which fits the data well is a potential economic law. It may be 
confirmed or rejected according to its abilities to forecast well. 
EN2: The methodology of econometrics is to search for good fits to the data.   
This can also be called a “nominalist” view – only the data matter, and the reality which 
generates the data does not. These methodological principles have led to a proliferation of 
worthless regression models, as we will demonstrate. In order to generate knowledge which 
accumulates, we need to switch to realist principles: 
ER1: Only regression models which capture/represent causal mechanisms are valid. 
ER2: We should search for surprising fits, as they provide clues to causal mechanisms 
operating in the real world. Then we should search for real world causal chains which can 
provide an explanation for the surprising fit. 
We will now explain the problems created by the nominalist methodology, and also how the 
realist methodology offers solutions to these problems. First, we list four cases where the shift 
from realist to nominalist methodology manifests itself in econometrics.   
3.1. An Attitude Problem: Technological Growth 
Barzel (1972) estimated the rate of technological growth by fitting a regression to annual data on 
winning speeds at the Indy 500 races.  Several subsequent papers (cited in Zaman (1996)) do 
many different types of fancy analyses on this same data set, with the object of obtaining 
information about rate of technological progress from these winning speeds. The question we 
want to ponder is: can fancy regression techniques extract more information about technological 
progress from the winning speeds data set? To put this in the methodological framework of the 
current paper, consider “reality” as the technology which is certainly one factor which determines 
the winning speed: 
Winning Speed = F(Driver Capabilities, Racing Environment, Car Technology) 
A realist methodology would look beyond the observed data to real factors generating the data. It 
seems abundantly clear that data on car engines would provide the best possible information 
about technology. Even though data on engine capabilities is easily available, none of the authors 
utilize this data. This reflects the nominalist attitude looking for patterns in the data rather than 
the underlying real factors which generate the data. In this particular case, the real factors (i.e. 
engine data) are easily available, observable, and quantifiable. Nonetheless, methodological 
blinders lead several analysts to focus on finding patterns in the winning speed data, while none 
go beyond the data to analyze technological progress as determined by engine capabilities. In 
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most cases, the real factors are unobservable and unmeasurable, which creates even greater 
obstacles to utilization of a realist methodology.   
3.2. From Cowles Commission to VAR Models 
The key contribution of the Cowles Commission was structural simultaneous equations. The 
economy was characterized by a set of structural relationships all of which held at the same time. 
Formulation and estimation of such equations required taking a stand on which variables were 
exogenous, which were endogenous as well as imposition of zero restrictions. All three of these 
represent causal information about real world structure, which should be provided by theory in 
advance of modeling. Exogenous variables are causes, endogenous variables are caused, and zero 
restrictions show absence of causal relationships. Thus the Cowles Commission approach was 
realist, though it had serious weaknesses and limitations, as discussed in Zaman (2010). Principal 
among these was the fact that causal structures were specified a priori, and there was no 
possibility of modifying these in response to evidence provided by the data. 
The oil crisis of the 1970’s and large forecast failures of econometric models led to substantial 
decline in the use the simultaneous equation models. Part of the decline can be attributed to the 
Sims (1980), who argued that the a priori causal information embedded in structural models was 
unreliable. As an alternative he offered VAR models, which are an ideal representation of the 
nominalist understanding of econometrics. All variables are treated alike in VAR models, without 
any reference to the real world structures which generates them.  
A recent Master’s Thesis received for review by the author illustrates perfectly the problems with 
VAR models. The thesis estimates a VAR model which includes the variables W(t),  A(t), and 
R(t) which represent wheat output, acreage devoted to wheat production, and the rainfall in year 
t. Because VAR methodology attempts to be agnostic about causal relations, the VAR model 
regresses both W(t) and A(t) on lagged values of the same variables W(t-1) and A(t-1), as well as 
other variables not relevant to our present discussion. Excluding the current acreage devoted to 
wheat A(t) from the independent variables determining W(t) will strongly bias any estimates. 
Similarly, any relation between contemporary acreage A(t) and W(t-1), or between R(t) and A(t-
1),  would seem to be purely a case of spurious correlation. Refusing to think about causal 
relations leads to attempts to measure correlations which are entirely accidental, and could not 
contribute to our understanding of real relationships between the variables.   In this particular 
example, the mistake is obvious, because the causal relations are known to us a priori. Similar 
problems commonly go undetected in the VAR literature, because of the complexity of economic 
relationships.     
The objection being raised here can be articulated more sharply in terms of “autonomy,” as 
discussed by Aldrich (1989). A VAR model measures a collection of partial correlations between 
a set of variables and their lags. These correlations have differing levels of “autonomy” – 
independence from possible disturbances and shocks to the system. Some variables X and Y are 
independent – the measured correlation between the two is entirely spurious. This happens 
especially frequently when the variables involve time trends, as is now well known. In other 
cases, the correlations can have varying degrees of autonomy. If consumers decide on current 
consumption levels on the basis current income without regards to other factors, then the 
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consumption relation will by highly autonomous – this is called a structural relation in 
contemporary terminology. The reverse relation, or the regression of Y on C, is a reduced form 
relation, the parameters of which will be influenced by changes in Investment levels, for 
example. It is far less autonomous.  Different regression relationships have varying levels of 
autonomy, depending on how resistant they are to interventions and changes in the system.  
Progress in understanding the economic system occurs when we learn to identify autonomous 
relationships and differentiate them from accidental ones. This always involves going beyond the 
observed patterns of correlations to consider the underlying economic structures which generated 
this pattern.  
The Harvard barometer was an attempt to make economic forecasts purely on basis of observed 
correlations, without any reference to underlying structures generating these correlations. This 
methodology failed and was abandoned. The VAR models represent the return of these 
barometric correlations on a grander scale. The observed correlations captured in VAR models 
can be potentially valuable clues to structure, if they are used in this way. Current econometrics 
methodology makes the mistake of treating these as the end product of statistical analysis, rather 
than as a first step towards discovery of structure.  
3.3. The Forecast Competitions M1, M2, and M3 
A regression model is valid only to the extent that it captures some causal mechanism operating 
in the real world. Such relationships have “autonomy” – because they capture real world 
mechanisms, they can be expected to persist beyond the period on which they are observed, and 
also in face of changing environments. Losing sight of this fact leads one to ask meaningless 
questions. Perfect examples of this are the forecast competitions which were conducted by the 
editors of the International Journal of Forecasting.  There are a large number of techniques which 
can be used to extrapolate any given time series: 
 Exponential Smoothing:  Single, Double, Holt-Winters, Damped 
 Time Series: ARMA, ARMAX, ARARMA 
 Neural Networks: Numerous variants 
 State Space Methods: Kalman Filter and variants 
Authors were asked to design forecasting algorithms, and these were tested on real world data 
series. The hope was to learn which of these methods has the best performance in terms of 
forecasting.  
Asking this question makes sense only within the context of a nominalist understanding of 
science. As long as all methods of pattern finding are regarded as being on potentially equal 
footing, one can ask whether some methods are more effective than others. From the realist point 
of view, the question does not make sense. The validity of any of the above methods will depend 
on how well the resulting model matches the real causal mechanism which generates the data. 
Since this cannot be assessed within the framework of the competition, we would expect 
completely random results in this forecast competition, just like the outcomes of a lottery. Some 
methods should work extremely well for some of series but not for others. Good performance on 
Zaman- Methodological Mistakes and Econometric Consequences 
109 
 
the first half of a series would be no guarantee of good performance on the second half. Similarly, 
good performance in this competition woud not say anything about good performance on a 
different set of time series. In fact this is exactly what was observed. After three competitions, the 
whole idea was abandoned, as nothing was learned from these competitions, except perhaps that 
simple methods work just as well as the most sophisticated ones. In fact, as we will discuss, 
simple methods can be expected to perform somewhat better.  
3.4. Lost Causes 
In an article of this name, Hoover (2006) documents how utilization of causal terminology 
declined dramatically in both economics and econometrics in the post-war period. Then, in the 
nineties there has been a dramatic upsurge. We reproduce on of the graphs depicting his findings 
in Figure 1 below.
3
 
Hoover (2004) poses the question of why causal language was dropped for several decades and 
also what accounts for its recent comeback? He goes through several potential explanations, 
including the influence of logical positivism, as partial explanation. He suggests that the root 
cause is the rise and dominance of mathematical and theory based approach, to the exclusion of 
real world data analysis. 
Zaman (2010) provides a detailed survey of the extant approaches to causality in the 
econometrics literature, and argues that all of them are seriously defective. The paper also 
discusses some promising new emerging lines of research. For present purposes, I would like to 
argue that 
1. Causality is of central importance in economics and econometrics. 
2. Current approaches to causality in econometrics, as taught in textbooks, are seriously 
deficient. This deficiency is due to poor methodology. 
 
                                                          
3
 Figure 1 below is reproduced from Hoover (2004) with kind permission of Cambridge University Press. 
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Instead of re-hashing the detailed explanation and support for the above two propositions 
provided in Zaman (2010), I would like to provide anecdotal evidence to support and amplify the 
suggested explanation of Hoover for “lost causes” in econometrics. This also bears directly on the 
theme of the present paper.  
Econometrics was originally thought of as a tool to utilize data to learn about the real world. This 
is what Hoover (2004) calls the “data first” approach.  However, the (statistical & mathematical) 
“theory first” approach gained the upper hand for several decades in the postwar period. During 
our graduate training in econometrics, we learned all the mathematical and statistical apparatus 
required to analyze data. The focus was on methodology of statistical inference. Our graduate 
courses did not deal with real data, except in a perfunctory way to illustrate the use of statistical 
techniques. Even though my own Ph.D. thesis was in the area of theoretical econometrics, I did 
not run a real regression on a real data set until twelve years after graduation.  This ties in with 
our theme that current econometric methodology is positivist, and is concerned purely with 
finding patterns in the data, and not with analyzing the reality behind the data.  
Another good illustration is provided by the VAR methodology of Sims. Calculating the impulse 
responses to shocks requires a Cholesky decomposition which requires ordering the variables in a 
causal sequence. Since the whole point of the VAR methodology is to describe the correlation 
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structure without putting in any “real world” information, Sims originally resisted the suggestion 
that calculating impulse response requires the input of causal information. However, this point 
has been reluctantly conceded, and VAR models with the required causal sequencing are called 
Structural VAR or SVAR models. Examining papers using this methodology, we find that the 
causal information is put into the paper in a very ad-hoc and perfunctory fashion. That is, the 
most important and central real world concern is incorporated in a superficial way, while the 
focus of the analysis is on mathematical dynamics of the resulting system of equations. This 
reversal of priorities is a consequence of the domination of the positivist methodology. Causality 
cannot be captured in mathematical terms or in terms of nominal patterns, since it deals 
essentially with the real world.  
The recent upsurge of use of causal language reflects a rising concern with real world data 
analysis. As Hoover contends, any approach which seriously engages with the data, will be 
forced to deal with causal concerns. For various reasons, including striking failures of the pattern 
finding approaches, there has been a rise in data oriented analyses and consequently a deeper 
engagement with causality in the recent past.   
4. FINDING PATTERNS VERSUS LOOKING FOR CLUES 
In the previous section, we discussed how the emergence of nominalist methodology has shaped 
research in econometrics. In this section, we discuss one of the two key differences between the 
nominalist and the realist approach. When we are looking for patterns, then the criterion is a good 
fit to the data; thus regression models are evaluated by their goodness of fit. In contrast, when we 
are looking for clues to understand reality, then we look for surprising fits. Each surprise 
generated by the data is a clue to a possible real structure which generates this surprise. This 
section is devoted to clarifying and explaining the difference.  
4.1. The opposition between surprise and good fit. 
One of the basic problems of econometrics is to discover the nature of a stochastic relationship 
between two variables. For instance, consider a set of data points (yt,xt) which reflect a stochastic 
relation yt=f(xt,t) that we wish to estimate. The function f is unknown, and the errors t reflect 
several types of uncertainties, principal among which are: 
1. Unobservable variables which affect the relationship  
2. Relevant variables on which data is not available.  
3. Relevant Variables not known to the econometrician to affect the relationship. 
4. Compensations for errors in estimating the function f.  
Standard operating procedure in this case would be to run a linear regression y = a + b x + . As a 
starting point, this procedure makes sense from the point of view of a realist methodology. Given 
two apparently independently generated time series, why should there be any relation between 
them? If there is a strong linear relationship, this is a surprising phenomenon, and worth 
investigating. Of course a test to assess the p-value of the strength of the relationship under the 
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null hypothesis that the two series are independent can be important to assess whether or not this 
is a surprising fit. How to construct a good test is not of relevance to the present discussion.  
It is the second step which is missing from current econometrics textbooks, which are all based 
on positivist methodologies. Once we learn that there is surprising correlation between y and x, 
we must investigate the reasons for this correlation. But such reasons necessarily involve going 
beyond the names “y” and “x” and involve learning what reality is named by these variables. For 
example, if the two variables are alternative sets of measurements of the same underlying 
quantity, then we have a clear explanation for the linear relation. Alternatively, there could be a 
causal relationship such that  x  y, or that y  x, or that some third variable z  x,y. In this 
last case, movements in z would lead to the appearance of a relationship between y and x. There 
are other possibilities as well; for instance, x might happen to be a good proxy for a cause of y in 
the time period under consideration. Without being able to differentiate between these myriad 
possible reasons for significant coefficients in a linear regression, just the observation of a good 
fit Y = a + b X does not add much to our knowledge of the real world.  In an article entitled 
“Statistical Models and Shoe Leather,” Freedman (1991) pointed out the necessity of expending 
shoe leather in investigating causal relationships. Real world knowledge acquired by “getting our 
hands dirty” is required to dis-entangle complex possibilities, and desktop calculations and 
complex mathematical modeling cannot substitute for this. 
Instead of taking it as a first step, as a clue to explore, conventional econometric methodology 
terminates at the discovery of a good fit. The discovery of a new relationship is announced to the 
world. Even worse is what happens when the linear regression does not fit well. In this case, we 
look for more complex models in an effort to fit the data. For the sake of simplicity, assume that 
we keep increasing the order of the polynomial until we find a good fit between y and x. It is 
obvious that this will always work, since a suitably high order polynomial will provide a perfect 
fit to all the data. What is the likelihood that a high order polynomial satisfying yt  P(xt) 
represents the true relationship between the two variables? The chances are virtually zero that the 
polynomial has any meaningful interpretation. This is because following the procedure outlined 
will lead us to find a perfect fit between any two variables, while we know in advance that not all 
pairs of variables are related to each other. This is also called “over-fitting”, as a high degree 
polynomial minimizes or eliminates the errors, incorrectly making them a part of the relationship 
between y and x.  
Since there is no surprise in our ability to find a high degree polynomial fitting the data, the 
polynomial itself just represents an observed pattern in existing data. Because such a pattern can 
always be found, we cannot ask the question of why such a pattern exists, and whether it reflects 
some real world relationship.  Whereas finding a good linear fit is surprising, and calls for an 
explanation, finding a good quadratic fit is less surprising. As we increase the scope of the search 
and the degrees of the polynomial, the chances increase that the fit of the model is purely an 
observed pattern which does not reflect any underlying real relationship. The goodness of fit 
moves in a direction opposite to the surprise generated by the fit. The more models we try, the 
better the fit and the less the surprise. 
Recognition of the problem exists. Many econometrics textbooks advise that only one model 
should be fitted to the data. This would certainly minimize the possibility of generating a 
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spurious fit, and the Hendry methodology (to be discussed later) is an honest effort to implement 
this idea. However, the implication here is that either the causal structure is left unexplored, or 
that it is specified in advance and not subject to investigation by data. This is a serious gap and 
deficiency. Equally serious, the prescription of fitting only one model is almost never followed in 
practice. Some consequences of this bad practice, almost guaranteed to lead to wrong models, are 
described below. 
4.2. Tools to fit anything 
We start with a finite data set, and seek to find a model which fits it. The required model must 
satisfy a large number of restrictions. In the ideal case, a model is given by the theory, and when 
we apply it, lo and behold, we find a miraculously good fit. This would be a wonderful 
confirmation of the theory, since it would be rather surprising to find a perfect fit on a first 
attempt. In practice, this almost never happens. We run through many different models until we 
find one which confirms our theory. Leamer (1978,  1983) has described the process of fitting a 
regression model as a “Specification search,” and argued that while this is useful for experimental 
data, it is either useless or misleading for observational data. This is because the large collection 
of tools at our disposal virtually guarantees that we can find a suitable model which conforms to 
whatever criteria we desire. The range of models we can try is infinite dimensional and limited 
only by our creativity, while the data set is fixed and finite. Test of residuals so strongly 
recommended by Hendry (1993, p. 24) have been appropriately called “indices of conformity” 
because they are not really tests. We can and do re-design the model to ensure that the residuals 
satisfy all tests.    
What are the consequences of overfitting, the standard operating procedure in econometrics? As 
we have argued earlier, overfitting will almost certainly miss any true relationships which exist, 
because it will build the errors into the function in the process of minimizing them. We provide 
evidence that we have the “tools to fit anything” – the infinite dimensional variety of theoretical 
models capable of conforming to any hypothesis about reality can fit any finite dimensional data 
set. 
Since Nelson and Plosser (1982) launched the literature, many authors have attempted to test 
whether macroeconomic time series are difference stationary or trend stationary. A lot of 
statistical and economic consequences hinge on the answer. Here is a list of the conclusions of 
authors
4
 who have studied the US annual GNP series: 
Difference stationary: Nelson and Plosser (1982), Murray and Nelson (2002), Kilian and 
Ohanian (2002)  
Trend Stationary: Perron (1989), Zivot and Andrews (1992), Diebold and Senhadji (1996), 
Papell and Prodan (2003)  
Don’t know: Rudebusch (1993) 
                                                          
4
 This material has been taken from Atiq-ur-Rahman (2011), which should be consulted for detailed references to the 
articles cited in this paragraph.  
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As is evident, consensus has not emerged, and there has been no accumulation of knowledge with 
passage of time. In setting up a unit root test, we have a choice of framework within which to 
test, and choice of test statistics.  Atiqurrahman (2011) has shown that these make a crucial 
difference to the outcome of the  test. He has shown that for any time series, we can get whatever 
result (trend stationarity or difference stationarity) we desire by choosing these two factors in a 
suitable way. 
As a second example, consider papers published which study the export-led growth (ELG) 
hypothesis for Indonesia. An alternative is the Growth-led Export (GLE). We can also have bi-
directional causality (BD), as well as no causality (NC). There exist studies confirming all four 
hypotheses
5
: 
ELG: Jung and Marshall (1985), Ram (1987), Hutchison and Singh (1992), Piazolo (1996), Xu 
(1996), Islam (1998), Amir (2004), Liwan and Lau (2007) 
GLE: Ahmad and Harnhirun (1992), Hutchison  and Singh (1992), Pomponio (1996), Ahmad et 
al. (1997), Pramadhani et. (2007), Bahmani-Claire (2009). 
BD: Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (1991), Dodaro (1993), Ekanayake (1999) 
NC: Hutchison and Singh (1992), Ahmad and Harnhirun (1995), Arnade and Vasavada (1995), 
Riezman et al. (1996), Lihan and Yogi (2003),  Nushiwat (2008) 
As illustrated above, on economic issues of interest, we can find published results confirming or 
rejecting almost any hypothesis of interest. For example, whether or not purchasing power parity 
holds, whether or not debts are sustainable, whether or not markets are efficient, etc. etc. etc. One 
of the central pillars of macroeconomic theory is the consumption function. There is a huge 
literature, both theoretical and empirical on estimation of the aggregate consumption function. 
Thomas (1993) reviews the literature and writes that: 
“Perhaps the most worrying aspect of empirical work on aggregate consumption is the regularity 
with which apparently established equations break down when faced with new data. This has 
happened repeatedly in the UK since the 1970’s. … the reader can be forgiven for wondering 
whether econometricians will ever reach the stage where even in the short run their consumption 
equations survive the confrontation with new data.”  
Magnus (1999) challenged readers to find an empirical study that “significantly changed the way 
econometricians think about some economic proposition.” We provide a more precise articulation 
of the challenge to conventional methodology currently under discussion. Our graduate students 
take courses, pass comprehensive exams, and write theses to qualify for a Ph.D. To ensure that 
they are adequately grounded in econometrics, suppose we add the following two requirements
6
:  
                                                          
5
 This material has been taken from Ph.D. Thesis of Hendri (2012), which should be consulted for detailed references 
to the articles cited in this paragraph. 
6
 This could be called the magnified Magnus challenge. 
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Test 1: Take any economic theory, and support it by econometric evidence. Or, a simpler version: 
for any two arbitrarily chosen variables X and Y, produce a regression showing that X is a 
significant determinant of Y. 
Test 2: For any current empirical paper from the literature, reach conclusions opposite to those 
reached in the paper using standard econometric techniques. 
How can we accomplish this? There is huge range of techniques, all of which can be 
demonstrated as acceptable practice using papers published in top ranked journals. We list some 
of the major ones: 
1. For each theoretical variable can be represented by a wide variety of observable time 
series. In many cases, a suitable series can be constructed, to suit requirements of the 
researcher. 
2. Additional control variables, dynamic structure, length of lags chosen, provide a large 
number of models to test for conformity to the desired hypothesis. 
3. Large numbers of tests, many known to have low power are available. Formulate an 
appropriate null hypothesis and fail to reject it using a test of low power. 
4. Unit Roots, Nonlinearity, Functional Forms, as well as ad-hoc assumptions create a huge 
range of possible models to try, one of which will surely work to confirm the desired null 
hypothesis. 
Virtually any outcome can be achieved by varying these parameters. Any professional 
econometrician worth his salt would easily be able to pass these tests without breaking sweat. 
Graduate students might have more trouble, but only really incompetent ones would be seriously 
delayed in graduation by this additional requirement. 
Unlike most tests, where passing counts for success, failing these tests is a fundamental 
requirement for a good methodology. Based on the assumption that currently acceptable 
conventional methodological practice in econometrics can pass these tests with flying colors, we 
assert that: 
PROPOSITION: Any methodology which can pass tests 1 and 2 is completely useless as a 
methodology for production of knowledge.  
It is immediately obvious that any methodology which can prove and disprove all possible 
economic theories is useless. We now pause to briefly discuss the Hendry methodology (also 
called the LSE methodology), which has some special characteristics. 
4.3. Failure of Hendry’s Methodology 
Conscientiously followed, Hendry’s methodology has a chance of failing the two tests proposed 
in the previous section. As such, it is a candidate for a viable methodology, even though our tests 
proposed are very weak – failing both of them is just a first and preliminary step to the possibility 
of that the methodology might be workable. A comprehensive and detailed examination of 
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strengths and weaknesses of the Hendry methodology (termed LSE methodology by them) is 
available in Faust and Whiteman (1997). To avoid length, we assume this as background 
knowledge, and provide an abbreviated discussion. We discuss the special features of the Hendry 
methodology, and also why it remains a positivist methodology, and hence is not capable of 
advancing knowledge.  
First, when we start with a general model, and simplify in the systematic way proposed by 
Hendry, it is possible to control the type I and II error probabilities of the tests. Thus, if we end 
up with a model satisfying all the properties required by the Hendry methodology, it does possess 
an element of surprise. As such, it is a worthy candidate for examination as to whether it 
represents some feature of the real world which makes it valid beyond the data set currently 
under examination. Unfortunately, Hendry’s methodology terminates with the finding of a 
“congruent” model – what realism requires is explorations of features of reality which account 
for the congruence; why does the model fit well? Without looking into this question, we cannot 
make progress in learning about the world. 
While the Hendry methodology followed rigorously has the potential of picking up interesting 
patterns in the data (worthy of further examination), pragmatic concerns vitiate this advantage. If 
the Hendry methodology leads us to a final model which does not fit very well – does not display 
parameter constancy for example, the methodology requires us to stop and declare failure. 
Unfortunately, editors won’t accept such papers, and authors must either publish or perish. 
Virtually no one would stop, and all authors will then introduce new variables (termed “designer” 
variables by Faust and Whiteman) or twists and turns in the model to try to make it fit. This 
immediately takes one outside the Hendry methodology, but is routinely done even by the best 
practitioners.  Furthermore, the consquences of this practice are not accounted for, as degrees of 
freedom lost by testing different models are “reclaimed” in the final model. Because these 
elements of ad-hockery inevitably find their way into practice, Hendry methodology does not end 
up doing significantly better than conventional alternatives. Models produced by it routinely 
break down in forecasting, and no striking discoveries of real constant relationships are on the 
record, as documented by Faust and Whiteman (1997).  
5. REALIST METHODOLOGY: INFERRING STRUCTURE FROM CLUES 
A huge number of patterns can be found in any given data set. Some of these patterns are 
accidental – they pertain purely to the data set at hand and will not extend to any larger data set. 
Other patterns are real – they result from some underlying real causes which generated the data. 
These real patterns have varying degrees of autonomy. The first task of the data analyst is to 
differentiate between the real patterns and the accidental patterns, and to isolate the patterns 
which are autonomous. This part involves some statistical and mathematical analysis, to assess 
degree of surprise, as well as statistical significance of departures from the null of no pattern.  
The second task is to look for the real causes which lead to this autonomy. This second step is 
inevitably non-mathematical, because it involves going beyond the names of the data set to 
explorations of the real world. This cannot be taught, except by apprenticeship and examination 
of case studies of how real causes have been discovered. Freedman (2008) and Freedman et. al. 
(2007) offers several examples of success and failure in statistical methods used for discovery of 
causal effects. These case studies clearly establish the importance of qualitative and informal 
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knowledge about real world. Conventional econometric methodology is a failure because it is 
merely an attempt to find patterns in the data, without any tools to assess whether or not the given 
pattern reflects some real forces which shape the data.  We provide an elementary example to 
clarify this distinction. 
5.1 Surprising Versus Strong Correlations 
Let {Xt,Yt} be a sequence of observations on two variables. Suppose these are apparently 
stationary: by this we mean that the sequence of differences from the means {Xt-m} does not fail 
any tests for being identically distributed
7
.  Then if X and Y are correlated, this means that 
positive values of the two difference series occur together, as do negative values. This is 
surprising; why should two apparently unrelated series move together? Before proceeding 
further, it is important to assess whether the non zero correlation is significantly different from 
zero. This is  to rule out the possibility that the pattern is due purely to chance variations.  Apart 
from purely statistical aspects, there are procedural aspects which must be taken into account 
very carefully, whereas current best practice in econometrics treats them in cavalier fashion. A 
spurious relationship in Zaman (2010) was obtained by searching over all pairs of correlations 
between C and Y for consumption and income series in the WDI database. The maximum 
correlation over a collection of pairs has a vastly different distribution from a single correlation. 
The critical values for significance would be substantially higher in this case. Yet it is common 
practice to ignore the search, and “reclaim” degrees of freedom lost by searching over models 
when presenting final results. According to the nominalist methodology, the process by which the 
pattern is found is not relevant, so it seems reasonable to ignore the search process which led to 
the final regression model. There is an uneasy understanding that the search process does impact 
on the statistical properties of the model discovered, but it is largely ignored in practice. For a 
realist methodology, the surprise in finding the model is of the essence. We cannot ignore the 
search process which led to the model, since it has a huge impact on the surprise. Just like 
econometricians have learned to adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity, we need to present 
search-adjusted p-values of significance. Quite a bit is known about this, but is ignored due to 
methodological blinders.  
Why do we restrict correlation to apparently stationary series? Again this has to do with surprise. 
Consider the possibility that X and Y are both series with strong increasing trends. Then the mean 
will occur near the middle, all of the initial set of differences from means from both series will be 
negative, and all of the later sets of differences will be positive. Then positives and negatives will 
occur together, and there will be strong correlation between the two series. However, there is no 
surprise in this movement together – it is a clear consequence of the trend. Thus, even an 
excellent fit is meaningless, and does not furnish any clues to any underlying reality. This 
demonstrates the importance of surprise, as opposed to goodness of fit.  
                                                          
7
 Note that this is an operational definition. Given a series, we can verify whether or not it has the property required – 
though there is an element of ambiguity because we have not specified all the tests required. As opposed to this, the 
assumptions that Xt is a stationary series can never be verified, because in all finite data sets, there exist arbitrarily 
close stationary approximations to the data distribution.  
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5.2. Using Clues to Uncover Causal Structure: 
Having found a surprising and significant pattern in the data, a realist must ask what it means. 
This step of going beyond the observable to the reality behind the observables was banned by the 
positivists. To undo the damage caused by positivist thinking, we must re-learn this skill which is 
currently not part of our textbooks and training in econometrics. In a realist methodology, finding 
of a pattern is a starting point for research and not the terminal point, as in the nominalist 
methodology.  
As discussed earlier, the concept of probability is inherently unobservable, because it makes 
reference to possibilities which might occur but do not. This is why we teach absurd and hard to 
digest definitions to puzzled undergraduates, who have a clear intuitive understanding of the idea 
that even though the coin came up heads, it could with equal likelihood, have come up tails; see 
Zaman (2008) for an extended discussion. Once we force them to discard their naïve intuitions 
and accept the idea that probability refers to limiting frequencies in an impossible to conduct 
sequence of trials, we force them to abandon intuitions and rely solely on complex and abstruse 
mathematics for understanding what is basically a simple concept. In exactly the same way, 
causality is inherently unobservable. Nonetheless, we all have strong intuitions about what it is, 
and routinely deduce causal effects in real life from a variety of clues. By framing the problem in 
a way that makes it impossible to apply these intuitions, we impede the progress of knowledge. 
Oaksford and Chater (2007, Introduction) have described the revolution in artificial intelligence 
that resulted from abandoning positivist models of human knowledge and reasoning, and 
adopting more flexible realist models developed by cognitive science. In a similar way, learning 
to reason about the reality behind the data may resolve the frustration about econometrics 
expressed by Magnus (1999) and Freedman (1997) cited earlier.  
Our goal in this section is to illustrate, via a simple example, how intimately real world 
knowledge is involved in the deduction of causality from data clues. This means that any process 
which uses nameless data (X,Y) without knowing what these variables mean, cannot lead to final 
conclusions about causality. Data can provide clues, even strong clues, but ultimate verification 
requires deeper investigation than is available from data alone. 
Consider the following (artificial) data about admission into Real University (RU). We assume 
rough equality of backrounds in the applicant pools of males and females for the reasoning which 
follows. 
 
 
 
 
Applicants  Males Females 
Total 1000 1000 
Admitted 300 700 
Percent 30% 70% 
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One would immediately guess that RU discriminates against males. The discrepancy in the 
admission ratio is so large that almost any method for assessing significance of difference would 
conclude that the null hypothesis of equality of admission ratios would be rejected. Note that we 
do not consider the possibility that Admission is a cause of Gender – students who are admitted 
get sex-change operations. Correlations are always symmetric, while causality is always 
unidirectional, so the pattern in the data can never be a depiction of reality.  Next suppose that the 
university has two major schools, sciences and humanities. Subdivided into these categories, 
admissions data is as given below: 
 Male Applicants Female Applicants 
School Social Science Engineering Social Science Engineering 
Applicants 100 900 900 100 
Admitted 100 200 690 10 
Percent 100% 22% 77% 10% 
Now it seems clear that the discrimination is against females. In both Social Science and 
Engineering, male candidates are preferred admits by a large margin. Males apply 
overwhelmingly to Engineering, which is hard to get into, while females apply overwhelmingly 
to Social Science, which is easy to get into. This accounts for the difference in overall admit 
ratios.   
The surface pattern of overall admits leads to a clear causal conclusion. Deeper investigation of 
structure reverses it completely. This shows that we can only get clues to causality from data, and 
only reach tentative conclusions – there may be hidden variables, which would change the 
picture. Knowledge about the real world is messy and it is not possible to encapsulate it in 
elegant mathematical formulae. Suppose we expend some shoe leather and go to the admissions 
department of the university in question. We find out that all applications are processed 
uniformly, without regard to which department the candidates have applied to. Candidates are 
ranked by SAT scores, and admission is given to the top 2000. Alternatively, we learn that 
candidates choose departments after they are admitted. Clearly we would renounce our causal 
conclusion and think about alternative explanations for the discrepancy in the admission ratios. 
Also, sitting in an admissions committee meeting at RU would give us important qualitative 
information about gender bias in admissions in a way that could not be easily captured in any 
data. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
When the proverbial apple fell on Newton’s head, he thought through to the invisible force of 
gravity which led the apple to fall. Positivist methodology would have led him consider the fit of 
his apple to the patterns made by apples falling in orchards – these are observable, while gravity 
is not. Positivist methodology dominated social sciences for the major part of the twentieth 
century. Positivists eschewed the real underlying structures, and said that scientific laws describe 
patterns in the observables. The particular, concrete, historical and unique events are therefore 
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not parts of scientific knowledge. In fact, these play an essential role in the body of human 
knowledge.  As the errors and weaknesses of the positivist methodology became apparent, there 
has been an effort to break away from this philosophy. Differing amounts of progress has been 
made in different disciplines, but a lot remains to be done.  
In this essay, I have focused on the effects of positivist methodology on econometrics. I have 
shown that current approaches based on finding patterns in data cannot lead to increases in our 
knowledge. Data and observations are only partial guides. Striking patterns in the data are clues 
to real structures. Exploring these clues requires acquiring and organizing information about the 
real world. There are two keys to developing a realist methodology for econometrics. The first is 
to measure surprise in how well a data fits a model. The second is to try and look for real causal 
mechanisms and structures which explain away this surprise. For both of these activities, there 
exists a substantial amount of existing material. Measurements of surprise via entropy and other 
techniques have been discussed for decades. There is a very active debate currently going on 
about how to deduce causal relations from observational data. Even though these activities are 
central to a realist methodology, currently these research areas are peripheral and marginalized 
because of the dominant positivist methodology. Progress requires changing priorities. 
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